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BOOK REVIEW

An Essay Review: The Payment System
Cases, Materials and Issues
By Edward
L. Rubin & Robert Cooter. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
1989.
THE PAYMENT SYSTEM CASES, MATERIALS AND ISSUES,

Reviewed by Professor Jerry Sloan*
This is a very good book.
Ever since the ancient Sumerians began to tinker with the metallic content of their coinage, we've had money problems. But the
Sumerians also discovered the "in box" and the "out box." It is this
mix of the metallic content of money and office routines, with the
addition of messengers (agents, some folks call them) and messages,
that has brought us into a computerized, cashless society in which
we push money into a terminal or pull money out of the same or a
different terminal, sometimes with the aid of messengers, but always
with the aid of pieces of paper, plastic, or electronic or emotional
impulses. The product of this evolution is now "the game."
The middle ages of payment systems lasted into the 1970's,
which ushered in the contemporary or advanced stages of what
might be called the payment system or "the game." Throughout this
long history some verities have endured. Impulses, messengers, and
lawyers (originally called high priests) have always been prominent.
In modern times, coincident with both the middle (Philistinean)
and advanced stages, the impulses have achieved labels such as for* Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A., J.D. University of Chicago;
Doctor en Droit, Universit6 d'Aix, Marseille; LL.M. Yale University.
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gery, fraud, error, mistake, and provisional settlement; while the
senders and receivers of messages have been left to battle it out since
the shaft case 1 gave the messengers their heyday.
This continuing war between senders and receivers of messages
has evolved into a struggle between people and institutions (primarily banks), which now involves both a basic law of the middle period,
the UCC, and the basic law of modern times, the Federal Reserve's
law.
Since we are, in this essay, concerned with modern payment
systems of Anglo American times, we shall exclude such oddities as
the French acte abstrait' and limit our discussion to the period beginning long after the great discoveries by our Sumerian progenitors-the period from the innkeeper's case'-to the period in which
the Federal Reserve System got into "the game" in an attempt to
readjust the flow of money through streamlining the check collection
system devised by the banks and their lawyers.
There is a rich tapestry in this overlap period between ages involving both people and institutions. In today's time when the institutions have taken control, there have been and still are many
problems. Banks and the corporations that banks have come to represent contain people who, like their containers, often appear to be
quite wooden. Other people, called customers, quite frequently play
the senders-receivers game with the institutions. "The game" is
played with money, checks, credit cards, and electronic transfers (a
new kind of impulse) of funds. Still other people, called scholars or
students (or professors and their apprentices or old lawyers and
young lawyers) spend much of their time worrying about how the
payment system works today and will work in the future. Many, for
example, wonder now about whether intervention by the Federal Reserve, through something called the supremacy clause of the highest
1. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
2. The best technical definition of the abstract act I have seen is contained in HARRIS &
TALLON, CONTRACT LAw TODAY 110,
68, 120, 17 (1989) (an Anglo American study). A
nontechnical and ideational explanation might be something like the following: An abstract act
conveys legal meaning by its existence to third parties not directly participating in its creation.
Vis, my lost unmarked ten dollar bill found by you will, in your hands, buy goods and services
from the provider of your choice. Again, the parking ticket the cop gave you when you had the
permissive use of my car, binds me, absent a defense, to pay the ticket (because the judge will
have me presumptively guilty because the cop wrote the ticket and put it on my car or gave it
to you) and I am in the judge's court. Again, your bank must pay the holder in due course of
the check for $10 you wrote to Mary who endorsed it to me: Now, since you owe me $10 for
the ticket, you should pay (forgetting my lost ten dollar bill) on the check. The point is that
the bill, ticket, and check are abstractions. They each, in their own way, convey a legal conclusion to the receivers be they from Paris, France or Paris, Kentucky.
3. Miller v. Race, I Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).

THE PAYMENT SYSTEM

and most basic of laws, has modernized the system or merely
defanged Articles III and IV of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).
Many American scholars have written about the problems of
Articles III and IV (negotiable instruments and bank's rights) and a
few have suggested that the Fed's regulations have tentacles extending well beyond those articles. No one, to this reviewer's persuasion, has described our total payment system until Rubin and
Cooter's The Payment System Cases, Materials and Issues came
along.
Although the focus of The Payment System seems limited to
describing "the system" as it now reflects upon Articles III and IV,
this is done magnificently. If it comes short of describing the possible
affect that federal regulation will have upon the rest of the UCC, it
does hint in that direction while nicely integrating our past and our
future to money and payment law.
Any treatment of a payment system should describe and prescribe how its host legal system deals with forms of wealth transfer
created or affected by "the system" it describes. Students and teachers, sometimes called scholars, of a payment system also need to
come to learn how their own payment system works. This book does
that for both groups and represents a fine reminder for practitioners
as well.
Yet, with the law as it is, there are still some very real problems
in dealing with the Articles Ill-IV part of "the system." Teachers
have nightmares about teaching in the Articles III-IV area because
"the game" seems uncertain and in need of new definition. These
teachers worry about how, within our payment system, to teach "the
game." Let's think for a moment of some of the implications of these
problems and of the encomia I have just suggested are deserved by
Rubin and Cooter.
How is "the game" played in this country? How does one explain Articles III and IV or, for that matter, the Code to students?
Au fond, one tries to insure that they understand, after a nearly
codeless or a completely codeless year, the transaction they are to
study. Then one tries to get the students to frame an issue in an
advisory, mediational, adversarial, or negotiating context not so as to
mouth the quintescence of the quintescence of a rule that has been
applied, but to look critically at "the system" being formed in their
minds in order to solve problems or, in advancing stages, to find the
appropriate policy.
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These policy notions are more difficult. In negotiable instruments law, more properly called check payment law, there is a system established for the benefit of its users. Who are the users?
Banks, people, and the government located in Washington, D.C. or
elsewhere. Since every system that creates institutions will attempt
to survive, all students know that the primary goal of any institution
within the system is the preservation of the system and the institutions it has created. But how does this system preservation work?
Rubin and Cooter's tome explains this, and the important secondary
policies as well.
The authors show us how banks in any modern payment system
will be preserved in their delicious solvency, and why losses which
inevitably occur in the system will be allocated, apportioned, shared,
or passed on. We see that policies sounding sensible enough to the
cognoscienti who work the system will inspire the system's continuance. The courts in this context will initiate and then follow some old
themes such as "good guys should win and bad guys should lose,"
some newer themes such as "the penalties should fall on least cost
avoiders" or, in another least cost avoidance tac, "the most negligent
party should pay the price." All of this has been spoken of before.
Yet this review is designed to give the reviewer's impression of what
The Payment System is and does.
There are at least three outlines for The Payment System
Cases, Materials and Issues by Rubin and Cooter: one provided by
the authors, another followed by the student from time to time during the first reading of the book, and the one discovered by the
teacher-lawyer when the book is finished. This reviewer has read The
Payment System twice, and the last reading has produced yet another viewl Since the final outline differs so little from the real outline, this review discusses the lex ferenda as the reviewer thinks
Rubin and Cooter meant it to be, after brief reference is made to the
other outlines in order to show the progress of one's thinking about
The Payment System. Accordingly, this reviewer attempts to capture the payment system's intertwined parts while proclaiming the
potency of the Rubin and Cooter approach in three layers: a brief
student's layer, a slightly more detailed lawyer's layer, and a
teacher's layer. This methodology will, it is hoped, replicate the discovery that tyro and pro alike should experience in forming the best
outline-her own.

THE PAYMENT SYSTEM

I. A Student's Layer-A Student's First View of Articles III and
IV Pre-Rubin and Cooter
There are people, individuals and corporations. These people get
called customers or depositors, drawers, and payees. Some of these
people write things on instruments (called items) so as to become
something called an endorser. There are also institutions, primarily
banks. These get titled as depository banks, collecting banks (both
sometimes confusingly styled intermediary banks), or payor or
drawee banks. Sometimes bank titles get changed or combined: it's
all very confusing. A single bank may wear two or three different
hats alternatively or simultaneously. Banks have customers (usually
people). Occasionally a bank looks like a customer. A customer
never looks like a bank. Any bank may represent a customer, another bank, or both as agent. The banks can take the paper (instruments) they handle in the item processing part of "the game" as
principle or agent as it suits them. When the bank acts as agent for
a customer, the customer is frequently stuck because these banks
give warranties to other banks playing "the game" with their own
customers. Some of the banks, as indicated before, seem to change
agency or principle hats in midstream. Usually, in terms of results,
banks can design situations to convenience the banking fraternity
rather than the customer community.
The pieces of paper (items) that the banks send around to each
other as buyer, seller, or agent are called checks or sometimes drafts.
The check is both an authorization and an instruction (message?). If
a bank pays such a thing in error or by mistake (payment, error, and
mistake are tricky words)" or pays it against an original or subsequent instruction (message) of its customer, or keeps the money
from a check that should have gone to its customer, or keeps the
money from a check deposited by the customer that she thought was
hers,5 the customer is in a bind. What is the customer to do? To
which bank? When? That's easy!
When a customer tries to do something to one of the banks
(usually her own personal bank, the depository bank or the payor,
4. Error is or was a justification for revoking a provisional settlement, and error and
mistake are perhaps two sides of the same coin in the old bank lexicon. See the related West
Side Bank case at 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
5. The bank's right of set off is another peculiar creature of the common law, left virtually without restraint by the UCC. It makes a very strong creditor of a bank which, just before
set off, was the depositor's debtor. See infra note 7 and accompanying text; Jensen v. State
Bank of Allison, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975). See also the excellent note at 283-86 of RUBIN &
COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM CASES, MATERIALS AND ISSUES (1989).
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sometimes called drawee bank) and does it successfully what will the
banks do inter se? Easy again! Under the scheme devised by the
Code in Articles III and IV (don't forget Article I)' banks almost
always win lawsuits with their customers, and when it comes to bank
v. bank, the playing field is slanted against the bank (depository
bank) whose customer started the whole deal by making a deposit or
against the bank (an intermediary or collecting bank, or perhaps a
drawee bank) that missed some kind of a deadline at midnight. Occasionally, a bank fails to obey a "stop that check" order or fails to
pay a check it should have paid for its customer or creates an unwanted overdraft against its customer.7 In a few of these cases, the
bank loses, but rarely, since the losing bank has its own customer
who can lose conveniently to the losing bank. This is because the
pattern throughout the UCC seems to be that if a financial institution dots its Is and crosses its Ts properly and says, "I'm sorry, we
couldn't help it in the ordinary course of business," the bank wins.
It seems like magic. You see a bank and its customer that has
an account with the bank have the dubious relationship of debtor
(bank) and creditor (depositor). Yet the bank, through reversing entries called chargebacks or by playing "king of the mountain"
(called set offs), can also change almost instantly from being a
debtor (loser) to a creditor (winner). It's all done with a hat trick
called the law merchant and its acte abstrait8 or, in the current vernacular, negotiability and its companion, the holder in due course
concept-once useful, but now fading away. After all, the banks are
pros and policies about professionals abound throughout the Code as
indicated in extensive notes following such sections as 1-205 and 2104.
Scholars complain about such things, and threaten to do some6. Sections 1-103, 1-203, and 1-205 are provisions that a student must always bear in
mind when reading Articles II and IV.
7. What is properly payable under § 4-401 is discussed in Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Fort Wayne v. Peoples Trust Bank, 177 Ind. App. 312, 379 N.E.2d 527 (1978). Banks,
it seems, can properly pay stale checks, ones they should have stopped, or those that create
overdrafts. Id. at 315-16, 379 N.E.2d at 529-30. There are, however, exceptions to the bank's
untrammelled rights to pay over valid stop orders. See FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank,
288 Pa. Super. 138, 431 A.2d 326 (1981).
8. The abstract act, see supra note 2, does not translate directly into negotiability. However, the check and the concept of negotiability arose from the law merchant. See RUBIN &
COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM CASES, MATERIALS AND ISSUES 3-9 (1989).
Gilmore, in The Death of Contract expressed such a view of the concept of negotiability
and later championed its fading away. Gilmore, Formalism of the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441 (1979). It is well known now that most checks are not
endorsed to anyone except a depository bank unless the payee tries to collect directly from the
drawee.

THE PAYMENT SYSTEM

thing about it once in a while. The Federal Reserve Bank (an intermediary bank for the most part) has changed a bit of this. But don't
take any wooden checks or checks made out on toilet paper because
the checks won't have a MICR.'
II.

A Lawyer's Layer

Rubin and Cooter's view of payments law speaks mechanistically from their table of contents, and synthetically, in the best sense
of that word, in their material and case selection. The outline being
formed in my mind now is implicit and explicit in their outline. As
one moves through The Payment System there are constant supra
and infra references to remind the reader of where she is. Now one
part of "the system" relates to one or more of the others to illustrate
a guiding parallel here or a nerve-wrenching assimilarity there in the
way our law handles money, checks, credit cards, and electronic
transfers of funds. One begins to perceive that her own synthesis was
only dimly perceived during this reading because the true outline is
so reticulated as to be Mozartian. This book has a life of its own.
Perhaps several. It does not contain the trap of a zillion error and
fraud cases (just 200 pages or so) usually found in most negotiable
instruments offerings; it keeps its sense of humor about good guys
and bad guys, analyzes "the system," and does a remarkable job of
synthesizing the important themes of "the system." The book's implications go well beyond Articles III and IV.
I'll let you in on a secret. A lawyer and her time are soon
parted. This means--don't waste time. That, in turn, means that in
writing a review the best tac is to say this is a good book, that is a
bad one, employ a few tedious footnotes both to satisfy the law review editor and prove up the case, and be done with it.
This is because much of the pap ordinarily written about payments law is for the edification of the few and the ossification of the
many. This book, however, has the punch of well-organized thinking
about an idea of some moment. Although it is written in casebook
form, The Payment System promises to be a great law book because
it is an original and ingenious compendium of the common law and
9. Magnetic Ink Character Recognition. Frequently, it is learned that a check need not
be written on a piece of paper supplied with printing by a bank and teachers cite the appropriate Code sections. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104 to 3-110. However, what the Code authorizes is not
always, in the eyes of clerks or assistant managers around the world, borne out in practice.
These people have, in my experience, demanded (where no counter checks were available)
magnetic ink character recognition pieces of paper. Many merchants will not accept a check
without a drawer's name and address printed on it for "insurance reasons."
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statutory history of our payment system, and includes an apt
description of how "the game" is played today. It is a welcome relief
for students of "the game." Its minuscule flaws, which can scarcely
be called errors, should not cause too much concern. I would suspect,
if I were a teacher, that it is also a fine teaching device.
A.

A Tentative Outline in Historical Setting

In the real world of 1758 it all began when the true owner of a
banknote for an odd sum of money issued by the Bank of England
requested that venerable institution to stop payment on his note,
which then reposed in the hand of a thief who had stolen it from the
mails. The Bank of England, sensing a potential meum-teum problem, requested an indemnity. When the true owner (T.O.) gave the
indemnity, the Bank of England, having prudently hedged its bet,
stopped the note. Meantime, an innkeeper turned up with the banknote at another bank to redeem it for cash.
The innkeeper was another good guy (man with money in hand)
who had received the note from the thief or, as we shall see later in
the course, more probably, the thief's successor in the ordinary
course of his (innkeeper's) innkeeping affairs. The teller at the second bank to which the innkeeper had gone did not wish to give succor to the innkeeper, which made the latter quite choleric. So, it was
innkeeper (seller of services) versus teller (ultimate lackey for the
Bank of England) or, indirectly if you will, Innkeeper v. T.O.1"
Lord Mansfield, who, along with some Germans, is said by some
to have unabashedly converted Karl Llewellyn to the law merchant
and other nefarious notions blew T.O. out of his majesty's waters by
creating bearer paper or at least a specie out of what had been
T.O.'s note.
No matter, the same crowd of merchant lawyers were to become responsible just four years later for hanging one John Lee because John had forged a drawer's name to a check which made the
drawee bank (payor bank as Rubin and Cooter would have it) take
the loss.1" Thus, it can be seen that the true owner of money (not a
check or a banknote) won because his banker gave out true owner's
money on an order or instruction not really signed by the true owner
and a check was, in effect, money. But a banknote was only an
unidentifiable thing with which one paid one's bills. Oddly enough,
10. Miller v. Race, I Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
I1. Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). See also U.C.C. §§ 3418, 4-213(1) (payor bank accountable for an item finally paid).
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that is still the law today with some negligence thrown in to protect
the banks in the forgery cases. Again, Federal Reserve banknotes
have become money that, in most cases, is better than checks. Today, banks also manage to beat the rap in other kinds of fraud cases
as well even though we no longer suspend the John Lees of this
world nor call most checks money.
B.

Later HistoricalDevelopments

In the middle or Philistinian Age of the development of our payment system, interesting tendencies began to emerge. For openers,
colonial banknotes (issued by various state chartered banks in the
Americas) and, later, personal checks began to be compared with
each other, and we seemed to be looking admiringly at the English
experience. After all, why shouldn't our law of the payment system
take the same path as England's? Checking accounts were in vogue
on both sides of the Atlantic for the well-healed and money was
money.
Later still, the banks had invented new kinds of money or payments such as the letter of credit, the cashier's check, the certified
check, and even the traveler's check (which looked strangely like a
cross between a cashier's check and a letter of credit).
Later still, in the highest stage of our developed legal system,
the banks were still inventing new games. First, came credit cards.
Then, funny machines that could hand out money and serve as depositories were devised. However, the law (the UCC) developed in
the meantime to accommodate such advances in banking practices
hadn't changed that much since poor Mr. Lee had been left suspended from the practice of writing abstract acts.
These developments, in practice if not in law, did not go unnoticed by the high priests of the money game. Some began to get the
impression that the ideas of pricing, transaction costs, indeed, the
pricing of transaction costs (whose ox is being gored?), efficiency,
and fairness (whose ox was being gored?) were important ideas to
consider in dealing with any payment device or in maintaining a
payment system. True, some of the high priests of the money game
(styled payment law) accused some of their colleagues of having sold
out to the banks 30 or 40 years before while attesting to the bank's
law. True, in the later or high stage of development of the money
system there were still many quarrels about this or that section of
the UCC, but nothing seemed to change.
Then came the thunderbolt. The Federal Reserve Bank, to the
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plaudits of some and to the dismay of others, sent its own message
by stepping into "the game" aggressively to change the bank's code,
not directly, but by supremacy. The Fed made some regulations. 2
These regulations affected the "in box" procedures of deposit and
collection from depository bank, intermediary, or collecting bank to
payor bank and radically changed the "out box" routines back from
payor banks by eliminating the intermediary banks that somehow
seemed to be in the way of fairness in the game. The Fed's regulations also hinted at far more radical maneuvers. Things were in a
flux, spelled "F" "L" 46U"1 "X" over the "float."
III. The Teacher's Layer
I teach Advanced Kontracts' 3 according to the gospel of St.
Karl that is Articles I-IX. The elementary courses in our shop are
styled contracts and contracts remedies. These little attempts to feel
at commercial law may or may not teach of the sources of possibilities inherent in the wanderings of The Good Ship Peerless 4 or of the
delightful metalegal ranges emanating from Rosie the Cow,' 5 because they are too strictly concerned with remedies in a universal
context. There isn't too much there about the statute of our commercial law.
Because of this normally tenuous exposure to the statute (the
UCC) I formerly taught Advanced Kontracts with some initial trepidation each time out of the gate. The anxiety was there because I
didn't always feel that my students were quite ready for the heady
stuff. Until The Payment System happened, I always knew that
when my charges were to be inflicted upon the unsuspecting public a
few years after doing commercial paper, sales, or secured transactions with me that, try as I would, some of my charges would not
completely understand the commercial transaction. They would not
understand the transaction because they didn't understand money.
12. Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 500 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.
1974), explains the meaning of Regulation J respecting settlement and collection. Regulation
CC looks backward (from payor to depository) to the dishonour and return of checks. Rubin
and Cooter also discuss the tangential Regulations Y and Z and are prepared to discuss any
other extant or proposed regulation from A to X as well.
13. K for contract is a reference to Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New
Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L.R. 213
(1966), and of course to the law merchant in Llewellyn's Kode. It seems, as suggested by
Gilmore, "anything ... good enough for Lord Mansfield was good enough for [Karl] Llewellyn." Gilmore, Formalism of the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441,
460-61 (1979). See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hur. & C 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
15. Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
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They wouldn't understand money because they could not understand
payment systems and their modalities. Each year, some students of
Advanced Kontracts were only vaguely conscious that there was
such a thing out there as a payment system, perhaps several. They
needed a money book. That anxiety is past now. Rubin and Cooter
have discovered and described "the system." They are on the money
in describing its efficiencies and its warts. They have shown how "the
system" works and disclosed its relative fairness. They have projected, almost, solutions into the future.
A. A Taxonomy of the System and Evaluation
What is The Payment System to Rubin and Cooter? How does
it work? How is the game played? A complicated set of questions
deserving of a simple tightly knit introduction of 40 pages containing
a glossary of terms and a framework for policy analysis which illustrates the criteria for judgment as well as the institutional framework used throughout the book. Serially, The Payment System deals
with cash as symbolic money or as a payment instrument, checks
from the perspectives of the game's major players, then describes
how the players ranging from people to every variety of bank and
nonbank (holding companies) play. Finally, credit cards (in several
varieties) and electronic fund transfers in all shapes, sizes, and impulses are examined with a view, in each chapter, to the policy criteria already stressed, accompanied with significant, texts concerning
pricing, collection costs, and the kinds of credit losses that can be
incurred with each form of payment. In every chapter there are further meaningful discussions of credit risks, loss allocations for error,
and fraud that are thoroughly examined and compared. The Payment System is a tour de force, ending as it began with a series of
questions. It is a prismatic ouvre, generating questions beyond commercial law into other much less imposing areas of the law. There is
no high to this book, it's all high.
Of particular interest to this reviewer is the glossary of terms,
and the Articles III-IV treatment of checks and the way in which
both mesh with Federal Reserve Regulations CC, T, and Z. In the
check part there is a "hands on" demonstration of the passage of a
check from drawer through depository bank, back to drawer using
an excerpt from Martin Mayer on how checks get collected. This
opening of the Article III and Article IV part of the book highlights
the book's treatment in reverse of the collection process by beginning
with the drawee-payor bank while explaining quite simply, the "no
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news is good news" phenomenon of check collection. Here again, the
background information given on interest rate restrictions, as such
relate to checks, and the constant references back to how one should
read or interpret a statute-the statute-are helpful to understanding the system and "the game" within the system. The book is very
user friendly to anyone trying to glue together her impressions of
how the float, N.O.W. accounts, and midnight deadlines fit into the
system. These diverse themes plus Hadley v. Baxendale, Price v.
Neal and yes, Miller v. Race, are all woven into the fabric in fine
perspective with incredible erudition, good humor, and penetrating
synthesis. It can be predicted that use of this book by tyro and pro
alike will quickly orient them about contemporary realities concerning payment law which are not the stock and trade of every commercial law person. The user of The Payment System also receives much
learning incidentally related to payments law, e.g., why the S & L's
are drying up; why discount rates affect the purchases of big ticket
items and small consumer purchases; how real interest rates are affected by inflation; and how and why Federal Reserve regulations
can or will affect such diverse concepts or creatures as: purchase for
value, good faith purchase, or bank holding companies. In sum,
Rubin and Cooter give meaning to concepts and structures that will
be encountered not only in Articles III and IV but in Articles II, V,
r
VII, VIII, IX and beyond.
B.

In Detail

In learning how a payment system deals with symbolic cash or
what is the price of any payment modality, students are inevitably
confronted with rules about market overt, the Rule of 78, not to
speak of the Rule of 72 that is, if their mentor is prepared to talk
about such.16 Further, real interest rates and indeed RICO are
surely of importance in understanding a payment system such as our
own. Again, side comparisons about the differentia between warehouse receipts, bills of lading, cashiers checks, and promissory notes,
whether discussed in the context of symbolic money, in terms of pricing, or in terms of security, are also meaningful to one trying to
grasp or regrasp the keys to the system and, of course, to "the
game."
16. 1 have never understood how banks used the Rule of 78. The Rule of 72 is prettier.
Pick a number and call it the interest rate at say 8% per period. 8 x 9 = 72, meaning that
your money at 8% will double in 9 periods. With 15, it will double in less than 5 periods. 12%
= 6, 10% = 7.2 periods, etc.

THE PAYMENT SYSTEM

The cant of many casebooks tries to hint at gaudy first principles or brooding penumbra's emanating from or to a "good guy bad
guy" scheme of reward and sanction. Frequently, such hints are not
developed but left hanging in those books. Rubin and Cooter avoid
this by excellent note discussion about the next case or a case two
hundred pages further on or to a case or principle suggested a hundred pages ago. These discussions constantly examine the grey elements of "the system." In all, there is a strong doctrinal familiarity
with the encompassing themes of Kontract and Advance Kontract
which are important to the discussion. Thus, from Miller v. Race
through Perini 17 and wherever relevant, there is opportunity to think
about consent, reliance, the prevention of unjust enrichment, and institutional protection as well as about Articles III-IV of the UCC,
the Fed, and how "the game" should be played.
As always, the criteria for judgment are used to show how "the
game" is played as well as how it plays. Thus, the money and cash
part of The Payment System connects beautifully to the other payment device treatments as well as to the check part that it precedes.
Using the cash part of the casebook as a backdrop, the normal tedium of a negotiable instruments offering is concluded with a note
on check truncation. The novice quickly realizes that later, in discussing point of sale transfers or debit cards, the same rules won't
fit. The pro, employing the same criteria for judgment, has already
realized or begun to realize what those rules might be. Further,
standardization of check collection practices, truncation, and the
main cases are woven together repeatedly so as to ask the inevitable
questions: How much does it cost? Who pays the price? Does it work
well? Is it fair? How can we discern and then correct flaws or bugs
or inequities? Does this decision or that Federal Reserve posture accommodate this or that policy criterion?
Rubin and Cooter dance elegantly through the old stuff like the
legal tender cases, while explaining, from time to time, money laundering and RICO, control of the newest payment devices, Articles
III-IV, and the role of the Fed in all of this from 1913 to the Millenium. This makes the journey through credit cards and EFT's relatively safe and absolutely grand, and helps make these discussions
some of the best I've seen.
There is some opaqueness, a sin of omission or two, and one
interesting repetition about the politics of the UCC. Yet, the numer17. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, Georgia, 553 F.2d 398 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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ous and pungent discussions of least cost avoidance, the "he who
deals with a thief' strain, the constant reminders of both the criteria
for judgment, and the reader's need to properly locate herself in the
part of the system being studied makes this tome with its minuscule
faults a genuine liberation from the cave.
Sure, Rubin and Cooter do not discuss letters of credit too extensively; nor do they belabor the big meaning or control of general
clauses such as 1-103; nor talk quite enough of good faith as related
to our payment system; nor do they explain why the cases almost
invariably assume that bankers always tell the truth. Sure, they give
short shrift to the still living negotiable promissory note, which will
not help teachers show students how to make one, nor do they go
into fine detail concerning how Federal Reserve Regulations J, CC,
or T or yet unwritten regulations may or will affect the rest of the
UCC. But they do carefully explain the function and effect of the
operating circulars, The Expedited Funds Recovery Act, and the
bank bias of Articles III and IV. Again, Rubin and Cooter's shifting
of loss policy questions, emerging comfortably from striking discussions of provisional and final settlements, credits, set offs, and control
of instruments is always "on the money."
One hesitates to suggest that any of the tiny sins just referred to
breach any kind of warranty because Rubin and Cooter have more
than substantially performed their appointed task. There is, however,
one sin of omission that should be noted. Even though the authors
could easily proclaim that the items about to be mentioned were
outside of their intended scope, it should be said.
They write nothing of commodity exchanges, nor about the
three things which, in addition to letters of credit (Article V), sales
people, who are secure (Articles II and IX), must understand to get
the whole picture. Rubin and Cooter should have discussed the short
sale and perhaps the put and the call.
The put and call concepts (relating obviously to Article VIII
and almost as certainly to variable output and requirements K's
under 2-305) are not necessary, but are merely helpful to understand
money and transactions in our payment system. I do insist, however,
that the short sale should have been discussed if only in glossary
form. This is because I view large parts of this work as necessary
background for systematic delving into the rest of Advanced Kontracts (Articles II, V, VII, VIII and IX). After all, the book does go
into extended treatment from glossary to conclusion about the Federal Reserve's implicit broad hints resonating upon the rest of the
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UCC, while the book's text attempts to restrict coverage merely to
Articles III-IV affect of the Fed regulations. Why not go for the
brass ring? A try for that laurel might have been accomplished by
some mention, somewhere, of the short sale. Because the short sale
relates, in a curious way, to settlements, set offs, and to daylight
overdrafts in the EFT System of the Federal Reserve, it is important
here. The fact is that banks get short in the EFT System. So might
nonbanks get dangerously short in the future when and if they get
full access to the EFT apparatus. More precisely, at provisional settlement (which is noontime) in the EFT System one might find participants (banks) showing huge deficits running into billions each
day stemming from overdrafts. These banks are simply "short" as
they say in the trade. Consider a day like October 17, 1987 or indeed, October 13 and 16 of 1989 when the overdraft ("short") problem could be exacerbated by large brokerage houses or international
corporations finding or sensing the need for quick infusions of funds.
To repeat, the short sale is a very important ingredient in the modern mix of how and why money gets passed around with certain payment modalities by some of the players. That's it.
One glossary item might, as follows, have been added to this
fine lawbook. A short sale of a commodity (here, including a security
or by analogy, money) is the sale of a commodity that the seller does
not own combined with the seller's underlying obligation to purchase
the same at some future time or sooner, at the seller's option. "The
future time" may be unspecified or seller's option to purchase may
be defined by a limiting future time (e.g., 3 months, 6 months, or
one year). The seller's account shows a profit if his sale price is
higher than the current market, i.e., market down, seller wins. Short
sales are regulated somewhat differently on stock exchanges or the
OTC markets and by commodities exchanges where the Fed does not
impose direct restraints on the practice of "being short."
Any person or institution having an account may be said to "be
short" in a regulated or nonregulated context, e.g., in customer or
bank overdraft situations. Thus, when the account shows a deficit or
a net debit position at any point in time, e.g., settlement or provisional settlement time, the customer is "short."
This book is "long."

